Do institutions primarily serve the policy interest of the rich and powerful states?

References to be referred to include: Linking the domestic and international arenas: • H. Milner (1999) “The Political Economy of International Trade,” Annual Review of Political Science 2:91-114, at [login to view URL] • Putnam, R. (1988) “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42: 427-460 The European Union: • M. Pollack (2010) “Theorizing EU Policymaking,” chapter 2 in H. Wallace, M. Pollack and A. Young (eds.) (2010) Policy-Making in the European Union (6th ed.) (Oxford: OUP). • R. Thomson (2011) Resolving Controversy in the EU (CUP), Chapters 7-10. o Text: [login to view URL] o Tables and figures: [login to view URL] • A. Moravcsik (1993) “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental Approach,” Journal of Common Market Studies 31(4):473-524. • A. Moravcsik (1999) “A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation,” International Organization 53(2):267-306. • G. Tsebelis & G. Garrett (1996) “Agenda Setting Power, Power Indices and Decision-Making in the European Union,” International Review of Law and Economics 16:345-61. • Lewis, J. (2003) “Institutional Environments and Everyday EU Decision-Making: Rationalist or Constructivist?” Comparative Political Studies 1(2) 97-124. • Golub, J. (2012) "Cheap Dates and the Delusion of Gratification: are Votes Sold or Traded in the EU Council of Ministers?" Journal of European Public Policy 19(2):141-60. • Golub, J. (2012) “How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in the Council of Ministers,” Journal of European Public Policy, available at [login to view URL] • Smith, M. (1997) “The Commission Made Me Do It: The European Commission as a Strategic Asset in Domestic Politics.” In At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission, ed. Neill Nugent. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Pp. 167-86. • A. Burley and W. Mattli (1993) ‘Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’, International Organization 47(1):41–76. • Follesdal, A. and Hix, S. (2005) ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik,’ Journal of Comon Market Studies 44 (3), 533-562. • M. Angelova, T. Dannwolf and T. König (2012) “How Robust are Compliance Findings? A Research Synthesis,” Journal of European Public Policy 19(8):1269-91. GATT/WTO: • Duchesne, E. 2005. Addressing systemic issues in the WTO, pp. 1–26. RBC Financial Group Economic Policy Research Institute, University of Western Ontario, EPRI Working Paper #2005-3. • F. Jawara & A. Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO (2003), ch. 1 • “Stalemate at the WTO: TRIPS, Agricultural Subsidies, and the Doha Round,” Harvard Business School Publishing, 9-711-043, January 2011 • “Note on WTO Disputes: Five Major Cases,” Harvard Business School Publishing, 9-703-016, September 2002 • R. Steinberg (2002) In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, International Organization 56(2):339-74. • Busch, M. and E. Reinhardt. (2003) “Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement,” Journal of World Trade 37 (4):719-735. Note: I would like the argument to focus on two aspect; policy making in the European Union as regard to the question and Trade policies as regards to the question. Hard style referencing. 2750 words 11 sources. must be completed by tomorrow. written to an extreme high standard.